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NOTES
Inheritance Taxation of Dower and Other Marital Interests
The first inheritance tax to be imposed in this country was enacted by
Pennsylvania in 1826.1 However, this early act, as well as similar statutes
enacted in other states prior to 1890, applied only to "collateral heirs";
amounts received by "direct heirs" (i.e., surviving spouse and children)
were exempt.2 Under these statutes, of course, no question was raised as
to the taxation of dower. But in 1891 New York extended its inheritance
tax to include a surviving husband or wife and other direct heirs.3 Ohio,
in 1894, and Illinois in 1895, did likewise. By 1920 nearly every state was
taxing both direct and collateral heirs. As a consequence, during the period
from 1900 to 1925 the courts in almost a dozen states were faced with the
problem of whether their inheritance tax law extended to property passing
as dower or curtesy.
As will be hereafter explained, from 1926 to 1948 there was in general
little or no opportunity for a saving in total death duties by excluding dower
from state inheritance tax. If the inheritance tax was reduced by taking
dower out of the taxable estate, the Federal tax (because of the operation of
the 80% credit), or the supplementary state estate tax, was increased by an
amount equal to the apparent saving. Consequently, this past twenty-five
years has seen very little litigation of this question.
In 1948 this picture was changed somewhat by amendment of the
Federal estate tax law to provide for a marital deduction. For federal
estate tax purposes the effect of this deduction in most instances will be to
remove from the gross estate the value of property passing as dower,
curtesy, or interest in lieu thereof. In many estates, therefore, the question
of whether or not dower and curtesy is subject to state inheritance tax may
again be important from the standpoint of total death taxes payable.
It is the purpose of this Note to survey the various state laws as to
their treatment of dower, curtesy, and other marital interests, from the
point of view of aiding the practitioner who is faced with the problem of
1. 2 REPORT TO JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVEN E-FEDERAL AND STATE
DEATH TAXES, pt. 2, 53 (1933). See pages 27-58 of this report, prepared by the
staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, for excellent short history
of death taxes.
2. Ibid. In 1890 collateral inheritance taxes were imposed by the following
states (date of enactment in parenthesis): California (1853); Connecticut (1889);
Delaware (1869) ; Maryland (1845) ; New York (1885) ; Pennsylvania (1826) ; West
Virginia (1887). Five other states had enacted inheritance tax laws, but had re-
pealed them before 1890: Alabama (1848); Louisiana (1828); New Hampshire
(1878); North Carolina (1847); Virginia (1844).
3. N.Y. Laws 1891, c. 215 (1891). Pennsylvania did not tax direct heirs until
1917, an 1897 attempt (with respect to personalty only) having been declared un-
constitutional. Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. 1, 43 Atl. 79 (1899).
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deciding whether or not he should contest a state inheritance tax assessment
on such interests. Related questions, pertaining to federal estate tax and
to treatment of amounts paid under antenuptial and postnuptial agreements
are also considered.
This Note does not purport to discuss the common law or statutory
attributes of dower, curtesy, and other marital interests, but a brief review
of these interests will set the stage for the discussion that follows.
DOWER AND CURTESY
Common Law.-Dower at common law was the widow's right for
life in one-third of the lands and tenements of which her husband had been
seised beneficially in fee simple or fee tail, at any time during coverture and
to which issue of the marriage, if any, might by any possibility have suc-
ceeded.4 During the lifetime of the husband, the wife's interest was jeal-
ously protected by the law; known as "inchoate dower," it was an incum-
brance on the land, and could not be defeated by any act of the husband
alone, nor by his will. After the death of her husband the wife's interest
became "consummate," and if the tenant of that part of the lands to which
she was entitled did not voluntarily give her possession, she could resort
to the writ of dower to realize her rights.5
The kind of interest which the husband possessed at common law in
the lands of his wife depended upon whether or not issue had been born of
the marriage. Prior to the birth of issue the husband enjoyed an "estate
by the marital right." 1 After the birth of issue capable of inheriting the
property, his right as tenant by the curtesy existed in all of the lands (not
merely one-third) of which the wife was seised at any time during cover-
ture in fee simple or fee tail. 7 Curtesy differed from dower in three prin-
cipal ways: (a) it extended to all of the wife's lands; (b) it did not attach
until issue were born; and (c) the husband was entitled to the income and
profits of his wife's lands from the moment that his interest attached, i.e.,
from the birth of issue. Curtesy was thus a present estate, as compared to
the inchoate interest of the wife.
Statutory modification.-Dower and curtesy were part of the common
law of the colonies at the time of the Revolution, and in general were ac-
cepted by all of the states 8 However, most jurisdictions codified the rules,
and the legislatures from time to time changed the quantums of the estates
of dower and curtesy as well as some of the other features. Today, in a
majority of jurisdictions (if the community property states be excepted)
4. 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWs 345 (1935); Haskins, The Defeasi-
bility of Dower, 98 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 826 (1950).
5. Haskins, A Problem in the Reception of the Common Law, 97 U. oF PA.
L. Ryv. 842, 845 (1949). For summary of present day actions available to the
widow see 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWs 498 et. seq. (1935).
6. Haskins, The Estate by the Marital Right, 97 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 345 (1949).
7. 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 528 (1935).
8. Id. at 346. With respect to Massachusetts, see Haskins, supra note 5.
common law dower is still in existence, subject to these modifications.9 In
most states the husband's right of curtesy has been changed to correspond
with the wife's right of dower.
In a number of jurisdictions dower is said to have been abolished, but
in most instances the statutory substitute retains most of the essential
characteristics of common law dower. In a few jurisdictions dower and
curtesy have been abolished in fact as well as in name, and in lieu of common
law dower the surviving spouse is given only a protected share as heir in
the property owned by a deceased spouse at the time of death. Two states,
the Dakotas, give the wife no protected interest whatever, and permit a hus-
band, if he wishes, to cut his wife off completely by will.'0 In the com-
munity property states, of course, dower does not exist; but the community
property system gives to the wife a vested interest in all of the property
acquired during the marriage by either spouse (with certain exceptions).
Thus, in nearly all of the states a wife's interest in her husband's real
estate is somewhat more than a "mere expectancy," though it remains some-
thing less than a "vested interest." In many jurisdictions the interest of
the wife is superior to the liens of the husband's creditors, and in a majority
of states, if the land is sold, she can as a practical matter demand a substan-
tial portion of the selling price, since by refusing to join in the deed she is
able to prevent the conveyance of a clear title."
Personalty.-Common law dower extended only to land. Modern
statutes usually give to a surviving wife the same interest in the personalty
of her deceased husband as she has in his real estate. However, in nearly
every state a husband during his lifetime has almost complete freedom to
deal with his personalty, and to dispose of it by gift or by sale without
restraint of any kind as long as his conduct is not a conscious fraud on the
wife. Thus, only in exceptional circumstances may the wife make any
claim as to personalty transferred by her husband before the date of his
death.1 2 Because this is so a distinction may sometimes be made for in-
heritan'ce tax purposes between realty and personalty.' 3
Modern legislation has also tended to give to a husband the same rights
in his wife's estate that she has in his estate. For the most part, what has
been said above with respect to dower is equally true with respect to a hus-
band's curtesy or interest in lieu thereof. Hence, the word "dower," unless
the context indicates otherwise. is now generally understood to comprehend
curtesy and statutory interests in lieu of dower and curtesy, as well as dower
at common law.
9. For a convenient summary of the extent to which common law dower has
been retained in the United States, see 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 347,
352-68 (1935).
10. See note 49 infra.
11. Haskins, stpra note 4, at 827. For a case where a wife demanded and ob-
tained a part of the purchase price, see Yost v. O'Malley, 88 F. Supp. 626 (Neb.
1950).
12. Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937) ; BREGY, PENNSYLVANIA
INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES AcTs OF 1947, 5853 (1949).
13. Such a distinction is made in New Jersey. See text at note 87 infra.
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GENERAL PRINcIPLEs RELATINTG TO INHERITANCE TAXATION OF DOWER
AND OTHER MARITAL INTERESTS
Inheritance taxes reach only those bequests, gifts and other "transfers"
of property or interests in property set forth by the tax law in effect at the
time of death. Whether the law of any particular jurisdiction purports to
tax dower can be ascertained only by first examining the nature of the
transaction or interest involved and then analyzing it in the light of the tax
law in question. If the tax law expressly refers to dower or other marital
interests of a surviving spouse, the status of such interests is, of course,
clear.' 4 Nevertheless in a majority of jurisdictions there is no express
reference to dower, and the only statutory provision in the inheritance tax
law that may be construed to include dower is a very general one that
sweeps into the taxable estate all transfers "by will or under the intestate
laws." The question is then presented whether the term "intestate laws"
includes statutes defining dower and other marital rights. Today the ad-
ministrative authorities in most jurisdictions answer this question "yes."
But only a few courts have considered the question, and most of these have
answered it "no," concluding that the statutes relating to dower, curtesy
and other marital interests are not part of the "intestate laws," and that
such interests are therefore not subject to inheritance tax.' 5 A few courts,
led by Illinois, have reached a contrary conclusion.' 6
Majority view.-Courts adopting the majority view stress the nature
of the wife's interest during the lifetime of the husband and the husband's
inability to deprive her of this interest. They point out further that the
widow does not take dower as an heir but receives her interest in her own
right. Thus, the Supreme Court of Arkansas said:
"We conclude, therefore, that the widow of a deceased person does
not take dower as the heir of her husband, or by virtue of the intestate
laws, but that this estate is inimical to the claim of the heir and is
carved out of the estate of the deceased in spite of and in derogation to
the rights of the heir under the intestate laws." ".
Similarly the Supreme Court of Nebraska, after extensive consideration,
concluded:
"At his death her interest therein comes to her in her own right.
It does not pass to her by will or by the intestate laws of the State.
The husband cannot deprive her of that right. It is argued that the
14. To tax dower as an inheritance does not violate due process. State v. Boney,
156 Ark. 169, 245 S.W. 315 (1922).
15. McDaniel v. Byrkett, 120 Ark. 295, 179 S.W. 491 (1915); It re Roger's
Estate, 250 S.W. 576 (Mo. 1923); Matter of Starbuck, 63 Misc. 156, 116 N.Y.
Supp. 1030 (Surr. Ct. 1909), af'd, 201 N.Y. 531, 94 N.E. 1098 (1911); Estate of
Lackman, 26 Ohio N.P. 387 (1927) (as to real property; contra as to personalty) ;
Crenshaw v. Moore, 124 Tenn. 528, 137 S.W. 924 (1911) ; and cases cited in notes
53 to 55 infra.
16. See cases cited in notes 34 to 37 infra.
17. McDaniel v. Byrkett, note 15 supra.
legislature having abolished the estates of dower and curtesy, the rule
[that dower is not subject to inheritance tax] has no application to the
present controversy. . . . The widow's share of the estate of her
deceased husband, by the present inheritance law, is given to her in
lieu of dower, and it follows that the interest . . . comes within the
test of immunity." 18
Minority view.-There is, of course, an obvious enlargement in the
control and enjoyment of the widow in the property of her husband at his
death, even though she had an "inchoate" interest during his lifetime. In
many states, too, the statutory provisions relating to dower and other
marital interests are not a separate title of the code, but are a part of a
chapter or title relating to descent and distribution. These facts have been
stressed by courts reaching the conclusion that dower is taxable as property
passing under the "intestate laws." 19 Finally, some courts, refusing to
permit dower to go tax free where property passes by will, have been in-
fluenced by the apparent unfairness of excluding dower from the taxable
estate where the wife elects to take against the will.20
Constitutionality.-Where laws expressly taxing dower have been chal-
lenged as unconstitutional, the courts have had no difficulty in upholding
them. The ripening of the wife's interest at the death of her husband is
supposedly sufficient to justify taxation.
21
DOWER UNDER STATE TAX LAWS
A survey of the tax laws and administrative practice with respect to
dower discloses a lack of uniformity among the states.
For convenience, the states may be divided into four groups: (1) those
in which, by statute or court decision, dower is clearly taxable; (2) those
in which the status of dower is unsettled, but the administrative authori-
ties contend it is taxable; (3) those in which, by statute or court decision,
it is clearly established that dower is not taxable; and (4) those in which
the administrative authorities at the present time do not contend that dower
is taxable.
Group .- The following states have statutes which expressly tax
dower, curtesy, and other marital interests in lieu thereof: Alabama,
22
18. Strahan's Estate, 93 Neb. 828, 142 N.W. 678 (1913).
19. See cases cited in notes 34 to 37 infra.
20. E.g., in State v. Dunn, 174 N.C. 679, 94 S.E. 481 (1917), the court states,
"It cannot be that if she took by will it was taxable, but if dissenting she took an
allotment of the same amount which she would have received if he 'had died
intestate' that the property is exempt from taxation."
21. State v. Boney, 156 Ark. 169, 245 S.W. 315 (1922); Allen v. Henggeler
32 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1929).
22. This state imposes a tax equal to the 80% federal credit for taxes paid to the
states. See text at note 59 infra. The federal estate tax law includes in the gross
estate of a decedent the value of any property "To the extent of any interest therein
of the surviving spouse existing at the time of the decedent's death as dower,
curtesy, or by virtue of a statute creating an estate in lieu of dower or curtesy."
INT. REv. CoDE §811(b). However, the marital deduction in most instances will
operate to exempt dower from the burden of the tax. See text at note 70, infra.
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Arkansas,23 Florida,22 Georgia,22 Mississippi, 23 New York,
23 Oregon,24
Rhode Island,2 5 Tennessee 26 and Wisconsin.
2 7
The tax statutes in the following states do not expressly refer to dower,
but do contain language which leaves little doubt that dower and other
marital interests are in the taxable category: Colorado,28 Maine,29 Okla-
homa,30 Vermont 3 1 and Wyoming.
32
In the following states the statute does not expressly refer to dower
but the higest court of the state has construed the phrase "intestate laws"
to extend to dower and other marital interests: Illinois,3 4 Minnesota, 5
Montana 3 6 and North Carolina.
37
Group 2.-In the following jurisdictions the tax law contains no provi-
sion expressly relating to dower, but the administrative authorities presently
contend that dower is taxable on the ground that the statutes relating to
dower are part of the "intestate laws" referred to by the inheritance tax
statute: Connecticut,3 8  Delaware,3 9  District of Columbia,4" Indiana,4 1
Iowa,42 Kansas,43 Kentucky,44 Massachusetts, 45 Maryland,46 Ohio 47 and
West Virginia.
48
In North Dakota and South Dakota a husband or wife has complete
freedom in disposing of his or her property by will, there being no privilege
23. This state imposes an estate tax which is modeled on the federal estate tax
law and includes a provision similar to INT. REv. CoDE § 811(b). See note 22 mspra.
24. ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN. §20-101 (1940).
25. R.I. GEN. LAws c. 43, § 4(5) (1938).
26. TENN. CODE § 1264 (Williams, 1943).
27. Wis. STAT. § 72.24 (1947).
28. CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 85, § 7 (1935) ("By statutes regulating descent and
distribution.")
29. ME. REV. STAT. c. 142, § 21A (1944) ("by allowance of a judge of probate").
30. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 989 (1942) ("by order setting apart property").
31. VT. STAT. tit. 8, § 1054 (1947) (uby decree of court").
32. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2102 (1945) ("by the operation of any of the statutes of
Wyoming which become operative to transfer property upon the death of a person").
34. Billings v. People, 189 Il. 472, 59 N.E. 798 (1901).
35. State ex rel. Pettit v. Probate Court, 137 Minn. 238, 163 N.W. 285 (1917).
36. In re Wilson's Estate, 102 Mont. 178, 56 P. 2d 733 (1936).
37. State v. Dunn, 174 N.C. 679, 94 S.E. 481 (1917).
38. Although the writer has not been able to obtain an administrative ruling on
the point as to this state, investigation of available sources indicates that the practice
in this state is in accord with the statement made.
39. Letter to the writer, dated Aug. 2, 1950, from State Tax Department.
40. Letter to the writer, dated July 31, 1950, from Office of the Assessor, Inheri-
tance and Estate Tax Division, District of Columbia.
41. See note 38 mpra.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Letter to the writer, dated Aug. 11, 1950, from Supervisor, Inheritance and
Estate Taxes, Dept. of Rev., Frankfort, Ky.
45. Letter to the writer, dated Aug. 2, 1950, from Commissioner of Corporations
and Taxation, Boston, Mass., states: "We are obligated to follow the statute without
any reference to dower or other marital interests."
46. Letter to the writer, dated Aug. 8, 1950, from Malcom G. Smith, Special
Assistant to Attorney General.
47. Letter to the writer, dated Nov. 1, 1950, from division of Inheritance Tax,
Department of Taxation, Columbus, Ohio. See, however, Estate of Albert Lackman,
26 Ohio N.P. 387 (1927), holding widow's dower in real estate (but not in personalty)
exempt from Ohio inheritance tax.
48. See note 38 vipra.
to "take against the will," nor any interest corresponding to inchoate dower
at common law. 49 Any property received by a surviving spouse from the
estate of a deceased husband or wife is therefore taxable (except, of course,
to the extent expressly exempted by the inheritance tax law).
Group 3.-Only one state, Missouri, by statute expressly exempts
dower from the operation of the inheritance tax. The Missouri exclusion
is very broad, and applies whether the surviving spouse takes under the will,
against the will, or by intestacy. 0
Nev Hampshire taxes only collateral heirs, and Nevada (a community
property state) imposes no inheritance tax. In these states, therefore, a
surviving spouse takes any property received from the estate of the other
free of state inheritance tax. However, residents of these states who own
real property in other states, or tangible or intangible personal property
having a "situs" in other states, may be liable for state inheritance tax to the
state in which the property is located.
Eight states 51 have community property systems-beyond the scope
of this discussion. However, in general a surviving spouse's one-half in-
terest is tax free. 2
In Nebraska,53 Utah 54 and Hawaii, 5 the courts have ruled that dower
is not subject to tax, and the statute has not been amended to change the
rule of these decisions.
Group 4.-In New Jersey,56 Michigan 
57 and South Carolina, 58
amounts received as dower by a surviving widow are not considered taxable
by the administrative authorities. In New Jersey, this exclusion applies
only with respect to real estate.
49. 3 VERNiER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 348, 364-66 (1935) ; N.D. REv. CODE
§§ 14-0708, 14-0709, 56-0204 (1943); S.D. CODE ANN. 14-0204, 14-0206, 56-0204
(1939).
50. Mo. REv. STAT. c. 1, art. 21, § 576 (1939), as amended by L. 1943, p. 305.
See In re Dean's Estate, 350 Mo. 494, 166 S.W.2d 529 (1942).
51. Arizona, Californa, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washing-
ton.
52. See Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho 258, 121 Pac. 544 (1912); Jones v. State,
5 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542 (10th
Cir. 1931).
53. Strahan's Estate, 93 Neb. 828, 142 N.W. 678 (1913) ; In re Estate of San-
ford, 91 Neb. 752, 137 N.W. 864 (1912).
54. In re Bullen's Estate, 47 Utah 96, 151 Pac. 533 (1915) ; In re Reynold's
Estate, 90 Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270 (1936).
55. In re Castle, 25 Hawaii 108 (1919). See 105 A.L.R. 380, 384 (1936). The
Hawaii community property law, enacted in 1945, was repealed prospectively in 1949.
L. 1949, Act 242.
56. Letter to the writer, dated Nov. 2, 1950, from State Supervisor, Transfer
Inheritance Tax Bureau, Dept. of Treasury, Trenton, N.J. In New Jersey dower
and curtesy relate to real property only, and any personal property received by a
surviving spouse is subject to inheritance tax. See also Hill v. Bugbee, 91 N.J.L.
454, 103 Atl. 861 (1918), aff'd, 92 N.J.L. 514, 105 Atl. 893 (1918).
57. See note 38 supra. Michigan adopted its inheritance tax law from New York,
and in general follows the construction placed on the New York law by the New
York courts. Stellwagen v. Wayne Probate Judge, 130 Mich. 166, 89 N.W. 728
(1902).
58. See note 38 s=pra.
1951] NOTES
986 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99
Slack tax.--Nearly all of the states impose a supplementary estate tax,
sometimes referred to as a "slack tax," designed to absorb any amount by
which the 80% credit under the federal estate tax exceeds the regular in-
heritance or estate taxes imposed by the state.5 9 Under these supplementary
taxes, dower is, of course, in effect taxed in the same manner and to the
same extent as under the federal law.
Taxation of Dower Where Widow Elects to Take Under the Will.-
Generally, if a husband dies testate, and his widow is not satisfied with the
provision made for her by the will, she may elect to take against the will and
receive dower or the statutory substitute therefor.60 In the absence of a
clear provision in the will to the contrary, a widow may not take under the
will and also claim her dower. 61 Nevertheless, it may be argued for in-
heritance tax purposes that though a husband purports to transfer the whole
of the property, he can transfer no more than what he has-that is, the fee
less the widow's dower. In the interest of equal treatment it may also be
urged that if dower is free of tax when the widow takes against the will, an
equal amount should be tax free when she takes under the will. With one
exception, 62 however, courts which have considered this problem have been
influenced by other factors, and have concluded that where the widow takes
under the will the full amount passing to her (less statutory exemptions)
should be subject to tax.6 On the other hand, these arguments for equality
of treatment have in some instances worked in reverse, and have influenced
some courts to deny deduction or exclusion for dower in any situation.
4
DOWER UNDER THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
Except for brief war-time emergency measures after the Revolutionary
Var, during the Civil War, and after the Spanish-American War,6 5 the
59. For explanation of this tax, see Note, 98 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 102 (1949).
60. 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 414-22 (1935) ; BREGY, op. Cit. mupra
note 12, at 2603-06.
61. Ibid. The rule was different at common law, but most states have statutory
provisions in accord with the rule stated in the text.
62. In re Estate of Sanford, 91 Neb. 752, 137 N.W. 864 (1912) reversing 90
Neb. 410, 133 N.W. 870 (1911) (value of dower interest should be deducted from
appraised value of estate, notwithstanding widow took under will, because to the
extent of her dower interest what the widow received was hers of her own right).
63. Schutte v. Bowers, 40 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1930); State v. Lane, 134 Ark.
71, 203 S.W. 17 (1918) ; Bernays v. Major, 344 Mo. 135, 126 S.W.2d 209 (1939)
(under prior Missouri statute); Arnett v. Bugbee, 98 NJ.L. 416, 119 Atl. 861
(Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd 99 N.J.L. 269, 122 Atl. 926 (1923) ; in re Stuyvesant's Estate,
72 Misc. 295, 131 N.Y. Supp. 197 (Surr. Ct. 1911) ; Estate of Osgood, 52 Utah 185,
173 Pac. 152 (1918). Cf. In re Church's Estate, 80 Misc. 447, 142 N.Y. Supp. 284
(Surr. Ct. 1913) ; In re Wetmore's Estate, 119 Misc. 771, 197 N.Y. Supp. 508
(Surr. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 237 N.Y. 529, 143 N.E. 730 (1923). Contra: Estate of San-
ford, sapra note 62.
64. E.g., State v. Dunn, 174 N.C. 679, 685, 94 S.E. 481, 483 (1917): "It cannot
be that if she took by will it was taxable, but if dissenting she took an allotment
of the same amount which she would have received if he 'had died intestate,' that
the property is exempt from taxation."
65. The 1898 Act, as well as prior acts, did not apply to transfers between
spouses. 30 STAT. 448, 464 (1898). For general history, see note 1 mtpra. The
1898 Act was repealed in 1902. This tax is discussed in Knowlton v. Moore, 178
U.S. 41 (1900).
Federal Government did not step into the death tax field until 1916. In that
year the first of the modern federal estate tax acts was enacted.6 This
Act, like most of the state inheritance tax laws then in effect, made no
express reference to dower. But the question was soon raised in the courts,
and in a decision based on the 1916 Act, it was held that amounts received
by a surviving widow as dower were not taxable.67 The Treasury Depart-
ment acquiesced in the decision. 681 Meantime, Congress in 1919 amended
the law by adding a provision which left no doubt that any interest received
as dower was to be included in the gross estate. 9
The Marital Deductio.-Notwithstanding that dower and interests in
lieu of dower are included in the gross estate for purposes of federal estate
tax, since 1948 these interests have in effect been freed of the burden of the
federal tax by the marital deduction. This deduction is allowed by section
812(e) of the Internal Revenue Code. Generally speaking, any amount
included in the gross estate on account of an interest in property of the
decedent received by a surviving spouse may be deducted in determining
the net estate. However, in no event may the deduction exceed 50%o
of the "adjusted gross estate" as defined by the statute, nor may any deduc-
tion be taken for what the regulations aptly call a "terminable interest." 70
EFFECT OF THE MARITAL DEDUCTION ON STATE INHIERITANCE
TAXATION OF DOWER
Prior to 1948, in perhaps a majority of very large estates, the total
inheritance and estate taxes imposed would not have been any less even
if dower had been exempt from state inheritance tax. The reason for this
seeming contradiction is that nearly every state imposes, in addition to its
regular basic inheritance or estate tax, a supplementary estate tax to absorb
the full credit allowed under the federal estate tax for taxes paid to the
states.71 Two illustrations will clarify this situation:
Illustration 1.-X, a resident of Pennsylvania, owned real and personal
property worth $600,000. He died in 1947 (before the marital deduction
was incorporated in the federal estate tax) leaving $150,000 to his wife
and the residue to be divided equally among his children, A, B, and C.
Assume that expenses of administration, unpaid debts, and other deductible
66. Revenue Act of 1916, 39 STAT. 756 (1916).
67. Randolph v. Craig, 267 Fed. 993 (M.D. Tenn. 1920).
68. T.D. 3165, 39 TREAs. DEC. 18 (1921). Cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 37, art. 7
(1917).
69. 40 STAT. 1057, 1097 (1919), popularly known as the Revenue Act of 1918.
See H.R. REa,. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 Cum.
BULL. 86, 101.
70. T.D. 5699, 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 181, amending Reg. 105 (1949). For an
excellent short summary and history, see BRUTON, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON FEDERAL TAXATION 771 (1950). Detailed discussion may be found in Sugarman,
Estate and Gift Tax Equalization-The Marital Deduction, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 223
(1948) ; Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61
HARV. L. REv. 1097, 1117 (1948).
71. See text at note 59 mspra.
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items total $50,000. If the widow elects to take against the will, and re-
ceives the share of the estate to which she is entitled in lieu of dower,
7 2
even though her interest is free of Pennsylvania inheritance tax, the total
Pennsylvania death duties will be $12,000. If dower be considered free of
inheritance tax, the basic state tax will be $7,333 and the supplementary
estate tax will be $4,667. On the other hand, if dower is subject to in-
heritance tax,'the basic Pennsylvania tax will be $11,000 and the supple-
mentary estate tax only $1,000. In both situations the total credit allow-
able under the federal estate tax is $12,000 and the supplementary estate
tax will be the amount by which this credit exceeds the basic inheritance
tax.
Illustration 2.-Assume the same facts as in Illustration 1, except that
death occurs in 1950 (marital deduction is therefore allowable for federal
estate tax). The total Pennsylvania taxes will now be affected by the
taxability or non-taxability under the state inheritance tax of the amount
received by the widow in lieu of dower. If the amount received by the
widow in lieu of dower is not subject to inheritance tax, the basic state tax
will be the same as in illustration 1, $7,333, but the supplementary estate tax
will be only $1,601. Reflecting the marital deduction, the maximum fed-
eral credit will be $8,934, and this in turn is the minimum total state death
duties. On the other hand, if the wife's interest is taxable, the state in-
heritance tax will be $11,000, and there will be no supplementary estate tax.
Thus, in the example assumed, it is apparent that under present tax
laws, whether or not dower is taxable may mean a difference in tax lia-
bility of $2,066 ($11,000 less $8,934). On the same facts, prior to the
amendment of the federal law to permit a marital deduction, there would
have been no net tax reduction.
The Pennsylvania Situation.-In Pennsylvania, common law dower
and curtesy have been abolished, but the statutory substitute retains the
common law incidents of dower.73 For example, the wife has an inchoate
interest in any realty of which the husband is seised or possessed during
the marriage, and cannot be divested of this interest without her consent.
If during coverture a husband sells realty without the wife's consent, after
the husband's death a surviving wife may bring an action in the Court of
Common Pleas to recover her statutory interest As to realty and per-
sonalty which the husband owns at the date of death, a surviving wife may
elect to take against the will to the extent of one-half or one-third, depend-
ing on the number of children.74 Similarly, if a wife owns realty, any deed
executed by her during her husband's lifetime, without his consent, is
absolutely void.
75
72. One-third to one-half, depending on number of children. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 180.8 (Purdon 1950).
73. Bridgeford v. Groh, 306 Pa. 566, 160 Atl. 451 (1932). For discussion of
Pennsylvania law respecting marital rights of husband and wife, see BREGY, op. cit.
supra note 12, at 601-62, 2601-16.
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.8 (Purdon 1950).
75. For discussion of Pennsylvania law with respect to conveyances by a wife
without the joinder of her husband, see BREGY, op. cit. supra note 12 ,at 653-62.
The Pennsylvania inheritance tax statute has no provision expressly
referring to dower. Any amounts transferred by "will or by the intestate
laws" are subject to tax,7 6 but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not
had occasion to decide whether this statutory provision extends to dower. 77
If a wife elects to take her statutory interest it would seem a reasonable
construction of the statute to hold that the amount she receives is not sub-
ject to tax. A decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1918 7s hold-
ing the $750 (then $500) "widow's exemption" to be free of tax would,
by analogy, appear to exempt the widow's dower at least as to realty. This
construction is also indicated by an early inheritance tax case that has often
been cited by the courts of other states for the proposition that dower is not
subject to tax.79 In this case Charles Avery had died in 1858 leaving a
widow but no father, mother, or lineal descendant. By his will he devised
his property (personalty $438,000, realty $30,900) in trust for designated
beneficiaries. The widow, by an agreement with the trustee, received
$80,000 for relinquishing all her interest in the estate. The Commonwealth
claimed that inasmuch as the entire estate passed by will to the trustee, the
amount received by the widow was subject to inheritance tax (at that time
only transfers to "collateral heirs" were taxed). In holding that no tax
was payable the court said: "Here it clearly appears that the widow refused
to take under the will, and did elect to claim her dower in the estate ...
But notwithstanding this we are asked to consider the sum thus fixed and
paid her as a payment out of the fund passed by the will to the beneficiaries
under it. This we cannot do. . . . She exercised her entire rights as a
widow, by taking the sum mentioned, and relinquished her right to the
balance, which would pass, of course, under the will."
The statutory substitute for dower, in the case of intestacy, at present
appears as part of the Intestate Act of 1947.80 This fact will, perhaps,
present the greatest hurdle in any argument that a widow's share resulting
from intestacy is not subject to tax. Nevertheless, the hurdle may not be
insuperable. In Bridgeford v. Groh 81 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
said that the forerunner of the present act, the Intestate Act of 1917, did not
"change the common law further than in the quantum of the interest given
to the widow." If this premise is true with respect to the 1917 Act, it is
also true with respect to the 1947 Act. And granting the correctness of
the premise, it would seem to follow that the amount which a widow receives
in lieu of dower should be considered free of inheritance tax, since she re-
ceives it in her own right, and not by descent or distribution from the estate
of her husband.
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2301 (a) (Purdon, 1949).
77. In Mitchell's Estate, 2 Pa. D. & C. 509 (1922), the court concluded that
$5,000 received in lieu of dower under laws then in effect was subject to inheritance
tax; but the question whether such amounts passed under the "intestate laws" was
not discussed.
78. Hildebrand's Estate, 262 Pa. 112, 104 AtI. 866 (1918).
79. Avery's Estate, 34 Pa. 204 (1859).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.5 (Purdon, 1950).
81. 306 Pa. 566, 160 Ad. 451 (1932).
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Administrative Construction.-The administration of the inheritance
tax law in Pennsylvania is decentralized, in that the tax is collected by the
Register of Wills of the county in which the decedent resided or owned
realty. In collecting the tax the Register of Wills acts as agent for the
state. But in the absence of published ruling of the State Department of
Revenue, which supervises the enforcement of the tax throughout the
Commonwealth, it is possible that the practice in different counties may
vary. The writer was unable to obtain from the Department of Revenue
any statement as to the attitude of the state authorities .
2
The Rule in Ohio.-The adminitrative authorities of Ohio follow the
practice of subjecting to tax the entire amount received by a surviving
spouse (in excess of statutory exemptions), whether she takes under the
will, against the will, or by intestacy.11 No exclusion or deduction is per-
mitted for dower or any interest in lieu of dower, with the possible excep-
tion of dower rights in property aliened by the husband during his lifetime
without the wife's consent.
The position of the Department of Taxation is based on Ohio laws
with respect to dower and the rights of a widow to take against the will.
Under existing law, after the death of the husband the wife's "dower" is
limited to real estate aliened by the husband during coverture without the
wife's consent.8 4  In lieu of dower in property owned by the husband at
the date of death, the widow may elect to take an intestate share.15
Under prior laws which gave the wife an interest in real estate similar
to common law dower, the wife's dower interest in realty, but not any
interest in personalty, was exempt.8 6
New Jersey Practice.-In New Jersey any personal property which a
surviving spouse receives, whether by taking against the will or otherwise,
is subject to inheritance tax. But the life interest in the husband's real
estate to which the widow is entitled as dower is not subject to tax if the
husband dies intestate, or if the widow takes against the will.8 7 Where the
widow accepts the provision made for her by her husband's will, no deduc-
tion or exclusion is permitted for the amount she could have elected to
take as dower. 8
82. The writer requested information on this subject from the inheritance tax
section of the Bureau of County Collections, Department of Revenue, but was told
that the Department would not rule on a hypothetical question.
83. In a letter to the writer, dated Nov. 1, 1950, from the Dept. of Taxation,
it is stated: "If the husband died testate, and the wife elects to take her distributive
share, under the provisions of § 10503-4. OHIo GENERAL CODE, the property both real
and personal is subject to the Ohio inheritance tax. Our statute of descent and dis-
tribution, § 10503-4, Ohio General Code, effective Sept. 2, 1935, takes the place of
vested dower. However, § 10502-1, Ohio General Code, effective the same date, re-
tains inchoate dower."
84. OHIo GENERAL CODE, § 10502-1 (Page, 1938).
85. OHio GENERAL CODE, § 10503-4, 10504-55 (Page, 1938).
86. Estate of Lackman, 26 Ohio N.P. 387 (1927) (widow took against the will).
87. See note 56 supra.
88. Arnett v. Bugbee, 98 N.J.L. 416, 119 Atl. 763 (Sup. Ct. 1923), af'd, 99
N.J.L. 269, 122 Atl. 926 (1923).
EFFECT OF MARITAL AGREEMENTS ON STATE TAXATION
In some states marital agreements and settlements may have the effect
of reducing the amount of inheritance tax.
Antenuptial Agreenzents.-Though antenuptial agreements are no
longer as common as they once were, persons about to marry sometimes
enter into contracts setting forth the rights of each in the property of the
other. Such agreements may in general take either of two forms: (1) a
promise to pay a stated amount at the time of death, conditioned perhaps
on survival, or (2) an immediate transfer of property or cash. Under
either form the consideration for the promise or transfer is a relinquish-
ment of all marital interests by each spouse in the property of the other,
except as set forth in the contract.8 9
In considering the taxability of transfers made under marital agree-
ments, the first inquiry is whether the state statute has a provision declaring
that a relinquishment of dower shall not be treated as consideration in
money or money's worth. Such a provision is found in the federal estate
tax law.90 and in the inheritance and estate tax statutes of a number of
the states. In a majority of the states, however, there is nothing in the
statute to prevent a relinquishment of dower from being treated as full con-
sideration to support a promise or transfer.
Immediate Transfers.-An example of the immediate type of transfer
is found in Merrill v. Fahs.91 Pursuant to an antenuptial agreement the
taxpayer, a resident of Florida, transferred $300,000 to his fiancee and
she in return released all her marital rights in his property, except the
right to maintenance and support. It was argued that inasmuch as the
value of the relinquished marital rights was at least $300,000, the transfer
was not subject to federal gift tax. But the U. S. Supreme Court held
that the gift tax law should be read in para materia with the estate tax law,
and concluded that inasmuch as a relinquishment of marital rights (other
than the right to support) was not consideration under the estate tax law, 92
it was not consideration in money or money's worth for gift tax purposes.
The $300,000 was therefore subjected to gift tax.
Although in the nature of a sale, an immediate transfer will therefore
not escape the federal gift tax if the amount exceeds the allowable exemp-
tions. Of course, like any other irrevocable transfer inter rivos, if not
89. A discussion of antenuptial agreements, with particular reference to federal
tax laws, appears in Murphy, Marital Settlements and Federal Taxatiob Spring-1950
WAsr. U.L.Q. 179.
90. See note 92 infra.
91. 324 U.S. 308 (1945). Cf. E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 166 (1946); McLean
v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 543 (1948).
92. "For the purposes of this subchapter, a relinquishment or promised relinquish-
ment of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy,
or of other marital rights in the decedent's property or estate, shall not be con-
sidered to any extent a consideration 'in money or money's worth'." INT. REV. CODE,
§ 812(b).
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made "in contemplation of death" and not "intended to take effect at death,"
it will escape federal estate tax as well as state inheritance tax.
Transfer in Trust.-An illustration of an immediate transfer in trust
is found in Ferguson v. Dickson.93 In that case Dickson had transferred
$500,000 in trust to pay the income to himself for life, then to his wife
for life, remainder to his children. The trust was created by Dickson in
discharge of his obligation under an antenuptial contract, and in considera-
tion of the relinquishment by Mrs. Dickson of all her marital rights in
Dickson's property, except her right to support. Dickson died after en-
actment of the Revenue Act of 1918 and the Federal Government attempted
to include the corpus of the trust in his gross estate. The 1918 Act had
an express provision taxing dower, but did not contain any counterpart of
the present section 812(b) providing that dower "shall not be considered
to any extent a consideration in money or money's worth." 9- It was
admitted that the transfer in trust was "intended to take effect at death"
because of the reservation of income, 95 but it was argued that the transac-
tion came within the exception pertaining to bona fide sales. The court
held: (1) the transaction was a "sale"; (2) the consideration was "fair"; 98
and (3) inchoate dower is the separate property of the wife, has pecuniary
value and, in the absence of a statutory definition such as is now contained
in section 812(b), is consideration in "money or money's worth." No part
of the trust property was therefore includible in the gross estate of Dickson
under the Revenue Act of 1918. While amendments to the federal law
make this result no longer possible with respect to federal estate tax, a
similar result might be reached today in determining state inheritance tax
liability where the state statute does not prohibit treating a relinquishment
of dower as consideration in money or money's worth.
97
Promise Creating a Debt.-The more common type of antenuptial
agreement involves only a promise to pay after the death of the husband.
One of the most famous examples of such an agreement is found in People
v. Estate of Field.95 Field and his fiancee, Miss Caton, prior to marriage
in 1905, agreed that if Field pre-deceased Caton, she should receive
$1,000,000 in satisfaction of all claims and rights as his widow. Field died
in 1906. The widow presented a claim for $1,000,000, based on the agree-
ment, and was paid. The executors then asserted that this amount should
be deducted from the gross estate for purposes of computing Illinois inheri-
93. 300 Fed. 961 (3d Cir. 1924) (Rev. Act of 1918; did not contain the pro-
vision quoted in note 92 supra).
94. See note 92 supra.
95. At that time May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), had not been decided,
and the Treasury contended that transfers reserving income for life were "intended
to take effect in enjoyment at death," and therefore taxable. See Comm'r. v. Church's
Estate, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
96. Compare the language of the present law, which requires consideration to be
"adequate and full."
97. See Neller Estate, 356 Pa. 628, 53 A.2d 122 (1947).
98. 248 Ill. 147, 93 N.E. 721 (1910).
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tance tax, since it was a legally enforceable indebtedness of Field. The
Illinois Supreme Court, nine years earlier, had held that amounts received
by a widow as dower were property passing "under the intestate laws"
and therefore subject to tax.99 Although the $1,000,000 claim took the
form of a contractual obligation, the court thought that inasmuch as the
consideration was a release of dower, the "debt" was merely a substitute
for dower, and therefore taxable. The court concluded that "any other
rule would enable parties desiring to do so, to in a measure defeat the
object and purpose of the statute."
Outside of Illinois, however, claims against the estate based on
antenuptial agreements have met with greater success tax-wise. One of the
most recent examples comes from Wisconsin, a state not noted for tender
treatment of wealthy taxpayers. In 1923 the decedent and his fiancee
agreed that if they married she should receive $25,000 at his death, plus
$2,500 quarterly for support during her widowhood. She relinquished
all marital rights in her husband's property. The decedent left his widow
nothing by his will. Holding that the amount received by the widow
under the contract was not subject to inheritance tax, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court said:
"It being a contract upon full consideration her claim amounts
to a debt against the estate of her deceased husband . .. If our
statute contained a provision to the effect that all property of the
decedent except such as might be due upon a contract consideration
for which was money or money's worth, was subject to taxation, we
should probably be obliged to reach a different result." 100
In Pennsylvania an antenuptial agreement ordinarily constitutes the
widow a creditor rather than an heir.10 1 There being no provision in the
Pennsylvania inheritance tax law prohibiting a deduction for a debt in-
curred in consideration of a release of dower, it would appear that an
amount paid to a surviving spouse under such an agreement should be
free of inheritance tax. A number of lower court decisions have reached
99. Billings v. People, 189 Ill. 472, 59 N.E. 798 (1901).
100. Will of Koeffler, 218 Wis. 560, 565, 260 N.W. 638, 640 (1935). In New
York, under the inheritance law in effect prior to 1930, a deduction was permitted
for claims under antenuptial agreements. Matter of Vanderbilt, 184 App. Div. 661,
172 N.Y. ( Supp.) 511 1st Dep't 1918), aff'd, 226 N.Y. 638, 123 N.E. 200 (1919)
($2,000,000 claim). Cf. Matter of Seitz, 262 N.Y. 32, 186 N.E. 193 (1933) deduc-
tion denied; the consideration was a bare promise to marry, the husband not possessing
any real property at the time the agreement was executed).
Under the federal estate tax law, after amendment so as to permit a deduction
only for indebtedness or obligations incurred for "an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth," deduction was generally denied on the ground that it
would undermine the express command of the statute thaf dower was to be included
in the gross estate. Empire Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 307 (4th Cir.
1938), affirming 35 B.T.A. 866 (1937). Cf. McCaughn v. Carver, 19 F.2d 126
(3d Cir. 1927) (Under Revenue Act of 1918); Stubblefield v. United States, 6
F. Supp. 440 (Ct. Cl. 1934) (Revenue Act of 1924).
101. Brown's Estate, 340 Pa. 350, 17 A.2d 331 (1941) ; Coane's Estate, 310 Pa.
138, 165 Atl. 2 (1933).
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this result, 10 2 and a recent opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
a case involving a postnuptial settlement indicates that the deduction is
proper.'
03
In a jurisdiction which permits a deduction for amounts received
under a contractual agreement, the tax advantage may be lost if the widow
elects to take under the will. Thus, in a Massachusetts case -0 4 an antenup-
tial contract provided that the widow should have $250,000 as a "debt
against the estate" in discharge of all the widow's marital rights. By will
the husband affirmed the contract, and then provided that the widow might
elect to take the sum from his estate in such bonds or stocks as she might
choose. The widow accepted the advantage of this election and received
$250,000 in securities. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
recognized that "if the widow had asked for and received $250,000 cash,
no inheritance tax could have been imposed upon the sum so paid." But
having accepted the optional settlement permitted by the will, she in effect
took under the will, and the estate was therefore denied the tax advantage
of treating the payment as the discharge of a debt.
Postnuptial Agreements.-Postnuptial agreements, as a result of en-
actment of the married women's property acts, are valid, and as in the case
of an antenuptial agreement constitute a "debt" of the estate. There is
no apparent reason why postnuptial agreements should be treated any dif-
ferently for tax or other purposes than antenuptial contracts, and courts
that have considered the problem have generally arrived at this con-
clusion. 0 5
In a recent Pennsylvania case, husband and wife, prior to divorce,
entered into a property settlement whereby the husband promised to pay,
in discharge of his obligation of support, certain sums during his lifetime,
plus one-fourth of the property remaining in his estate at his death. In
consideration of this agreement, the wife apparently relinquished all her
marital rights in the estate of her husband. The husband died, and under
the terms of the agreement the wife claimed and was allowed $10,000.
The Commonwealth asserted that the $10,000 paid the wife was a transfer
intended to take effect in possession at death, and demanded payment of
inheritance tax. Without questioning the correctness of the inclusion of
the transfer in the taxable estate, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that no tax was payable because the $10,000 was at the same time a bona
fide deductible claim incurred for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth. 6
102. Thomas' Estate, 30 Pa. D. & C. 53 (1937); Fridenburg's Estate, 8 D.
& C. 705 (1925). Cf. Cherry's Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C. 378 (1937).
103. Neller Estate, 356 Pa. 628, 53 A.2d 122 (1947) (postnuptial agreement).
104. Hill v. Treasurer, 227 Mass. 331, 116 N.E. 509 (1917).
105. See BMGY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 718-19.
106. Neller Estate, 356 Pa. 628, 53 A.2d 122 (1947). Cf. Stadtfeld Estate, 359
Pa. 147, 58 A.2d 478 (1948) (liability for prorated portion of federal estate tax);
Estate of Mills, 51 Lanc. L. Rep. 345 (Pa. 1949) ; Fisher's Estate, 88 Pier. L.J. 403
(Pa. 1939).
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Whether the rule of this case will be applied in Pennsylvania where
the release does not include the right to support is not clear. The opinion
of the court stressed the support rights and, in view of a strong dissent,
might have arrived at a contrary conclusion if the relinquishment had re-
lated only to dower rights. However, the result should be the same in
either situation.10 7 The reason that dower developed was to provide a
means of support for the widow and this original purpose still motivates,
at least in part, statutory provisions which assure a widow a share of her
husband's estate.'08
A distinction is made for federal gift tax purposes between a relin-
quishment of dower rights and a release of a wife's rights to maintenance
and support during the lifetime of her husband. To the extent that a
transfer is made in consideration of a release of support rights, as con-
trasted to dower rights, no federal gift tax will be incurred.10 9
Settlements Under Divorce Decrees.-If an amount is paid to a
spouse in discharge of marital property and support rights pursuant to
a divorce decree, and not solely as a matter of "promise or agreement,"
both federal gift tax and estate tax, as well as state inheritance tax, may
be saved.
In Harris v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 10 a husband and
wife entered into a property settlement agreement whereby the husband
was to receive $100,000 from the wife, who had a substantial estate. The
agreement was expressly made conditional upon approval by the divorce
decree and was to be binding only after the entry of a decree of absolute
divorce. The divorce was granted; the settlement approved without
change; and the wife carried out the terms of the agreement. The Com-
missioner contended that the transfer of the $100,000 was without con-
sideration in money or money's worth and therefore constituted a taxable
gift. But the Supreme Court held that inasmuch as the payment was
made pursuant to the divorce decree and not merely because of the "prom-
ise or agreement," no gift tax was payable. The court noted that the
limitation in the federal estate tax law pertaining to non-recognition of a
relinquishment of dower or marital rights as consideration in money or
money's worth pertained only to "promise or agreements." The payment
having been made under the compulsion of the divorce decree, it was not
within the terms of the gift tax statute-even though construed in pari
inateria with the estate tax law-and was therefore free of tax.
107. The language of the opinion in Stadtfeld Estate, 359 Pa. 147, 58 A.2d 478
(1948), indicates that the court would not regard a release of marital rights other
than the right to support any differently than support rights.
108. "The purpose of dower was to provide for the widow's support after the
husband's death; and dower was, in effect, an extension of his inter vivos duty of
support." 3 VERMNER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 346 (1935). "Her dower is intended
for her support and maintenance and an intention to tax it will not be imputed to the
legislature." Crenshaw v. Moore, 124 Tenn. 528, 535, 137 S.W. 924, 925 (1911).
109. E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. BuuL. 166 (1946). Cf. McLean v. Comm'r, 11 T.C.
543 (1948).
110. 71 Sup. Ct. 181 (1950).
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Although the court did not have before it the question of treatment
of such payments for purpose of the federal estate tax, the reasoning would
indicate that payments pursuant to a divorce decree are deductible from
the gross estate.
Income Tax.-As indicated heretofore, if a husband transfers property
to his wife in consideration of her relinquishment of her marital rights,
but not including her right to support, the transfer (to the extent that it
exceeds statutory exemptions) will be subject to federal gift tax."' If
made in any of the twelve states that have enacted gift tax laws, 1"2 the
transfer may also be subject to state gift tax."3 It should also be recog-
nized that various income tax problems may be encountered by both the
transferror and the recipient, if the transfer is in property other than
money."
4
SHOULD THE STATES TAX DOWER?
Upon the death of one of two partners, no one would contend today
that the surviving partner's share of the partnership property should be
subjected to inheritance tax, even though the bulk of it might be attributable
to the personal services or ingenuity of the deceased partner. All that
is included in the estate of the deceased partner for purposes of either
state inheritance tax or federal estate tax in such a situation is the pro
rata share of the decedent. That the surviving partner's control and en-
joyment of the whole partnership property is somewhat increased is not
material in this situation.
The theory that marriage is, from an economic standpoint, a partner-
ship and that the surviving spouse should be entitled free of tax to one-half
of all the gains and profits during coverture has been rather consistently
followed in the community property states, and there are indications that
this view is making headway elsewhere. For example, in recent years
many states have increased the share of an estate that a surviving spouse
111. See text at note 91 smpra.
112. Gift taxes are in effect in the following states: California, Colorado, Louisi-
ana, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin.
113. However, if the state does not have a provision in either its inheritance
tax law or its gift tax law comparable to § 812 (b), quoted in note 92 stpra, the state
courts may not follow Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945). In such a case the
position taken by the dissent in M1ferrill v. Fahs would have even more force.
114. E.g., see Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Comm'r, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947) (basis
for computing gain on sale of shares of stock received pursuant to antenuptial
agreement). For discussion of some of the income tax problems presented, see
Murphy, mipra note 89. See also Digan v. Comvz'r, 35 B.T.A. 256 (1937) ($15,000
paid to wife to obtain release of marital rights not deductible from selling price);
Frank v. Comm'r, 51 F.2d 923 (3d Cir., 1931) ($40,000 paid wife to obtain her sig-
nature on deed held deductible by husband in determining selling price); Yost v.
O'Malley, 88 F. Supp. 626 (Neb., 1950) ($2900 paid wife to obtain signature on
deed for Nebraska realty held deductible in determining gain on sale).
may take against the will and in some instances have diminished the
power of either spouse to defeat the interest of the other.115 Thus, in
Pennsylvania the interest of the wife in personalty may no longer be
defeated by the creation of a revocable trust.116
Moreover, nearly all of the states imposing inheritance taxes have,
by exemptions or classification of rates, recognized that distribution to a
surviving spouse should be encouraged. The marital deduction permitted
under the federal estate tax law is further evidence of this trend. In
some states, including Pennsylvania, property held by husband and wife
in joint tenancy or as tenants by the entirety is not taxed.11 Similarly,
life insurance is exempt if paid to a "named beneficiary." Consistency
would seem to demand that the marital interest of a surviving spouse should
be free of tax.
Were the question still open, much might be said for excluding dower
and other marital interests from the gross estate for purposes of the federal
estate tax, as an alternative to the complicated "marital deduction" pro-
visions as they now exist. One purpose of permitting this deduction was
to achieve substantial equality between the common law states and the
community property states. A provision permitting a deduction for dower
and other marital interests would have accomplished substantially the
same result without the difficulties of computation inherent in the scheme
as adopted.
Special Reasons Apply in Pennsylvania.-In Pennsylvania there is a
further reason why dower should be exempt from the inheritance tax.
The legislature has expressly provided for exclusion of property held by
husband and wife as tenants by the entirety."18 Where a husband owns
property in his own name, as a practical matter under Pennsylvania law
a wife has almost as much control during her lifetime as in the case of a
tenancy by the entirety and can be deprived at his death of only two-
thirds to one-half thereof (depending on number of children).1x0 The same
economic and social considerations, the desirability of encouraging a hus-
band to make adequate provision for his wife after his death, that have
led to tax exemption for property held as tenants by the entirety and for
115. 3 VERNiER, AmERICAN FAMILY LAWs 371, 372 (1935). For example of
greater protection granted by the courts, see Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9
N.E.2d 966 (1937).
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Purdon 1950). For discussion of the effect
of this statutory provision, see BREGY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 5853-83.
117. In perhaps a majority of the states, one-half of property held in joint
tenancy with right of survivorship is subject to inheritance tax. This rule is also
followed in Pennsylvania where the joint tenants are not husband and wife.
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2301(e) (Purdon, 1949).
119. The most substantial difference is with respect to the right to income,
in the case of a tenancy by the entirety each spouse being entitled to one-half thereof.
Under either type of ownership the husband cannot convey without the wife's con-
sent, and she may demand a proportionate part of the proceeds of any sale. See Frank
v. Comm'r, 51 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1931).
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life insurance may be urged to support exemption for dower and other
marital interests. Insofar as a policy is apparent from existing legislation,
it would therefore seem consistent to exclude dower and other marital
interests from the reach of the Pennsylvania inheritance tax. A further
reason for excluding dower in Pennsylvania is the construction placed
upon the uniformity clause of the state constitution, whereby exemptions
of specific amounts are apparently not permitted.12 0 Express statutory ex-
clusion of all dower and marital interests might well be granted by the
legislature in lieu of a specific exemption.
A final, but perhaps most important, legislative consideration is the
effect upon tax revenues of a provision exempting dower. In view of the
current pressing need for revenue, any tax relief provision that would
decrease total state revenue to any substantial extent would obviously have
little or no chance of enactment. It is open to question, however, whether
exemption of dower would seriously curtail the total revenue. In large
estates it is not too difficult for a husband to provide for his widow without
subjecting his property to transfer tax at both his death and his wife's
death. Even in small estates a great part of the property will escape tax
in Pennsylvania because of its being held by the spouses as joint tenants.
CONCLUSION
While the federal estate tax law provides for inclusion of dower and
curtesy interests in the gross estate, the marital deduction in many in-
stances will in effect render such amount non-taxable. Since most of the
states have so-called slack taxes based on the 80% federal credit, this
freedom from the federal tax may result in rendering the question of
applicability of the state inheritance tax of substantial importance.
In most of the states, if dower is taxed for purposes of state inheritance
tax a saving may be effected by the execution of property settlement agree-
ments. However, if there is an immediate transfer of property pursuant to
such an agreement, gift tax, and possibly income tax, problems will be
raised.
It would be desirable for the legislatures of the various states to con-
sider the matter, and if necessary amend their inheritance tax statutes so
as to clearly define the tax status of dower. The decision as to whether
or not it is subject to tax should be consistent with the treatment of joint
tenancies and life insurance; that is, all three of these interests should be
accorded the same treatment taxwise, since the underlying policy consid-
erations are substantially identical.
John D. Smyers.
120. Estate of Cope, 191 Pa. 1, 43 Atl. 79 (1899). The Direct Inheritance Tax
Act of 1897 was held unconstitutional because it provided an exemption of $5,000.
Cf. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 Atl. 598 (1935) (income tax).
Rights of Equitable Owners of Corporate Shares
Since the day of Adam Smith's treatise on the Wealth of Nations, the
economic and industrial organization of the United States has become
ever more intricate. In more recent decades, the corporate entity has
become the most widespread and most powerful form of business associa-
tion in our country.1
When the advantages of the corporate entity as a business association
were first realized and made use of, those who provided the capital usually
ran the organization personally. As corporations grew larger and more
financial backing was needed, it was necessary to turn to outside sources;
and this was done by offering, publicly or privately, shares of stock in the
organization. At that point the basic concept, which has been almost com-
pletely lost sight of today, was that the shareholders were the owners, and
that the officers were their servants, or agents. Today publicly held stock
corporations occupy a dominant place in all phases of our economic life.2
Their growth has been closely accompanied by a now almost complete
divorce between corporate ownership and corporate control. "The man-
agers came to be their own supervisors, and the stockholders were moved
into a position of effective subservience to those who by tradition and law
were their servants." 3 Directors have often become self-perpetuating and
opportunities to fill their pockets at the expense of the investors are wide-
spread.4 This is not to suggest that a majority, or even a large percentage
of corporate managers are dishonest, but merely to show that opportunities
are present and, due to the weakness of human nature, some form of check
is desirable. Quite naturally, the people primarily interested in checking
abuses by management are those whose money is invested in the enterprise.
However true the statement, often made by those who oppose any effective
control by the shareholders, may be that today's shareholder is primarily
an investor, interested in dividends and not in being an entrepreneur, the
fact remains that he is vitally interested in protecting that investment.
Shareholders are usually divided into two main groups-legal and equi-
table.5 It is the purpose of this Note to consider a few of the rights of this
latter group. Brief consideration will first be given to two fields in which
the law is well settled, and the discussion will then turn to more contro-
versial topics.
RIGHT TO VOTE AND RECEIVE DIVIDENDS
Most states have provided that it is necessary to be a shareholder of
record in order to vote.6 However, the equitable owner may protect his
1. NAT. REsOURcEs Comm., T E STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1939).
2. In 1933, the 200 largest non-financial corporations had physical assets com-
prising one-half of the total industrial wealth of this country. Id. at 106-107.
3. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1305, 1308 (1934).
4. BERLE AND MEANs, TEE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 86-
88 (1932).
5. The term "equitable" shareholder includes many categories: transferee who
has not had the transfer recorded, pledgee of stock, cestui que trust, holder of street
certificates, etc. Wherever possible the category under consideration will be indi-
cated.
6. E.g., DEL. REV. CODE § 2049 (1935).
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interests by going into equity and compelling the record holder to give him
a proxy.7 A further protection is provided in that the record owner may
not vote or give a proxy in hostility to the wishes of the beneficial owner.8
If he does so, he is liable to an action for damages. 9 Where there is no
such provision in the state laws, the courts have accorded the beneficial
owner the right to vote. 10
In the case of dividends, it is again generally provided by state law
that the corporation may rely exclusively on its records.'" Such laws have
been held to be solely for the benefit of the corporation and in no way to
affect the rights of beneficial owners.12 Consequently, record holders who
do not also possess the equitable rights in the shares are considered to hold
the dividends in trust for the equitable owners, and may be sued by the
latter for failure to deliver them.' s
In such matters as voting and the payment of dividends-matters which
occur frequently and in which there is a need for rapid, precise action-it
is administratively desirable to allow a corporation to rely on its records
in determining who are entitled to those rights. As long as provision is
made whereby equitable shareholders can safeguard their interests, it is
difficult to see how such rules can prejudice them.
Attention will next be given to rights which have involved much con-
troversy and litigation.
RIGHT OF INSPECTION
At common law, corporate shareholders had a right to examine, at
any reasonable time and for any reasonable purpose, any one or all of the
books and records of the corporation. 14 The most effective remedy for
enforcing this right was a mandamus action.' 5 Statutes were also passed 16
guaranteeing this right. Although it has been held that these statutes are
7. Vowell v. Thompson, 3 Cranch 428, 442 (U.S. C.C. 1829) ; McLain v. Lanova
Corp., 39 A.2d 209 (Del. Ch. 1944); Hoppin v. Buffum, 9 R.I. 513, 11 Am. Rep.
291 (1870).
8. Comm'r. of Internal Revenue v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 102 F.2d 397
(6th Cir. 1939); Tracy v. The Brentwood Village Corp., 59 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch.
1948) ; In re Canal Const. Co., 21 Del. Ch. 155, 182 Atl. 545 (1936) ; Strong v. Smith,
15 Hun 222 (N.Y. 4th Dep't. 1878).
9. Witham v. Cohen, 110 Ga. 670, 28 S.E. 505 (1897).
10. E.g., In re Algonquin Electric Co., 61 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1932).
11. E.g, DEL. REv. CODE § 2049 (1935).
12. E.g., Lunt v. Genesee Valley Trust Co., 162 Misc. 859, 297 N.Y. Supp. 27
(1937).
13. Richter & Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 At. 600 (1922); Stuart v.
Sargent, 283 Mass. 536, 186 N.E. 649 (1933); Martindell v. Fiduciary Counsel,
133 N.J. Eq. 408, 30 A.2d 281 (1943).
14. E.g., Lewis v. Brainerd, 53 Vt. 519 (1881); 2 CooK, CoRoRATioNs § 511
(8th ed. 1923) ; 5 FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPoRATIoNs § 2230 (Perm. ed. 1938);
6 THOMPsON, CORPORATIONs § 4525 (3d ed. 1927).
15. 2 COOK, CORpORATIoNs § 513 (8th ed. 1923); 5 FLETCHER, CycLoPEDIA OF
CORpORATIONs § 2250 (Pern. ed. 1938).
16. E.g., NEW YoRK STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 10 (1940).
merely declaratory of the common law right, 17 they have generally been
construed as enlarging and extending that right.18 Corporations have
usually considered this a nuisance and therefore have tried to evade it. One
of the most popular methods is demonstrated by a provision of the General
Motors corporate charter which reads, "No stockholder shall have any
right to inspect any account or book or document of the Corporation,
except as conferred by statute or authorized by the Board of Directors or
by a resolution of the stockholders." 10 A recent study of one hundred
large corporations revealed that twenty-five of the twenty-seven in Dela-
ware contained similar provisions.2 0  The purpose would seem to be to in-
timidate legally illiterate shareholders, since even the Delaware courts have
declared these provisions invalid. 21
As to the rights of equitable shareholders to inspect, the courts are
divided. Some statutes limit the right specifically to record holders; 22
and such restrictions have been upheld on the grounds that they are
reasonable limitatibins, tending to avoid unreasonable and improper de-
mands.23  A Delaware case provides an excellent example of the harsh
results reached by strict adherence to such statutes. In State ex rel. Healy
v. Superior Oil Co.,24 the court held that persons entitled to inspection are
to be determined solely from the stock ledger, regardless of beneficial
ownership. This then has the effect of granting the right of a share-
holder to one who is not beneficially interested in the corporation, while
denying it to the real party in interest. By subsequent decision,25 it was
decided that the holder of a voting trust certificate is not entitled to man-
damus since that is a legal remedy and his rights are purely equitable. The
court suggested that plaintiff might have a remedy in equity 2 6 However,
a shareholder's petition in equity to inspect corporate books has been denied
unless the shareholder desires information for use in another suit.
2 7
Even in the absence of statutes, early cases in other states reached
substantially similar results. In New York, it was held that neither a
17. See State ex rel. O'Hara v. National Biscuit Co., 69 N.J.L. 198, 200, 54 At.
241, 242 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
18 E.g., Shea v. Parker, 234 Mass. 592, 126 N.E. 47 (1920).
19. See Hornstein, Rights of Stockholders in the New York Courts, 56 YA.Ez
LJ. 942, 946 (1947).
20. Koenigsberg, Provisions in Corporate Charters and By-Laws Governing the
Inspection of Books by Stockholders, 30 Gzo. Lj. 227, 244 (1944).
21. State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 143 Atl. 257
(1926).
22. DELAWARE CoRpoRAloN LAW ANN. § 29 (1949) ; NEW YORK STocK CoRpoRA-
TioN LAW § 10 (1940).
23. Neiman v. Templeton, K. & Co. 294 Ill. App. 45, 13 N.E.2d 290 (1938).
24. 40 Del. 460, 13 A.2d 453 (Super. Ct. 1940).
25. State ex rel. Crowder v. Sperry Corporation, 41 Del. 84, 15 A.2d 661 (Super.
Ct. 1940).
26. Id. at 88, 15 A.2d at 664.
27. Parrish v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 21 Del. Ch. 121, 181 Atl. 658 (Ch.
1935); Fuller v. Alexander Hollander & Co., 61 N.J. Eq. 648, 47 Atl. 646 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1900).
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temporary administrator,28 nor an unrecorded transferee,2 9 was entitled to
inspect. The court there has not gone so far as to make registration in
the stock ledger the controlling qualification. They denied the right to
mandamus to a registered holder who had endorsed his certificate in blank
and delivered it to a trust company pursuant to a contract of sale.30 In
Missouri, a case arose in which the corporation wrongfully refused to
transfer petitioner's shares into his name. The court held that he must
first bring suit to have the shares registered in his name and then enforce
his right to inspect.31 In Illinois, a corporation underwent a reorganization
whereby the stock of the new organization was put in the name of certain
depositaries, and participating certificates were issued to the shareholders
in the old association. When the latter attempted to inspect the books of
the new corporation, the court decided that the corporation could recognize
only the record holders-regardless of the beneficial interest.32  In New
Jersey, it has been held that a holder of an endorsed stock certificate is not
entitled to inspect until he becomes the record owner.33
Until 1942, there were very few decisions adopting a more liberal
view. One strong case did arise in Indiana in which the court held that
neither an agent, a trustee, nor an assignor has the right to inspect even
though they are the shareholders of record. 34 The court said that the right
to inspect belonged exclusively to the real parties in interest. The court
would seem to have been overzealous in denying this right to trustees and
agents, who may well have a legitimate interest in inspection. The New
York court, in 1942, made a significant addition to the rights of holders of
voting trust certificates.35 The court decided that even though it was
necessary to be a holder of record under the state statute, 6 the petitioner
retained his common law right to mandamus unless he had alienated that
right in the articles of trust. Since the relevant statutes have generally
been construed as enlarging the common law right,37 this would seem to
be a valid and desirable interpretation, and one which would provide
equitable holders a means of investigating the books and thereby effectuating
those rights which courts have afforded them.3 8  The following year, the
28. Matter of Hastings, 120 App. Div. 756, 105 N.Y. Supp. 834 (1st Dep't
1907).
29. In re Reiss, 30 Misc. 234, 62 N.Y. Supp. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
30. In re Gaines, 180 N.Y. Supp. 191 (Sup. Ct. 1919), af'd, 179 N.Y. Supp.
922 (1st. Dep't 1920). Contra: Lawshe v. Royal Baking Powder Co., 54 Misc. 220,
104 N.Y. Supp. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
31. State ex rel. Manlin v. Druggists' Addressing Co., 113 S.W.2d 1061 (Mo.
App. 1938).
32. Babcock v. Chicago Rys., 325 Ill. 16, 155 N.E. 773 (1927).
33. Mateer v. New Jersey Telephone Co., 5 N.J. Misc. 261, 136 AtI. 317 (Sup.
Ct. 1927).
34. Bowser v. State ex rel. Hines, 192 Ind. 462, 137 N.E. 57 (1922).
35. Brentmore Estates v. Hotel Barbizon, 263 App. Div. 389, 33 N.Y.S.2d 331
(1st. Dep't 1942) ; cf. Bresnick v. Saypool, 57 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
36. See note 22 supra.
37. See note 18 supra.
38. E.g., Chandler v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 57, 162 Atl. 63 (Ch.
1932) (right to review a corporate election) ; United States Independent Telephone
Co. v. O'Grady, 75 NJ. Eq. 301, 71 Atl. 1040 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909) (right to
wind up business).
Illinois court held that the holder of a voting trust certificate, which stipu-
lated that he should have the rights of a shareholder for purposes of in-
spection, was entitled to examine the corporate books.39 While this is
obviously not as strong a holding as that in New York, it at least demon-
strates a method whereby, in those states where restrictive legislation has
not been passed, the voting trust certificate holder can insure to himself
certain rights he might otherwise be deprived of.
The independent attitude of corporate management is apparent espe-
cially with regard to the rights of shareholders to inspect the corporate
books. This was illustrated in 1946 by the statement of a vice-president
of General Motors Corporation that, "'Are don't even open our books to our
stockholders." 40 In preparing the material for this Note, the author was
told by a lawyer in one of the country's largest corporations that, "When-
ever anyone wants to inspect our books, we turn them down, whether they
are record holders or not. It's too much of a nuisance." The right to
inspect is a sine qua non of the protection of equitable shareholders. Often
there is no other way of discovering fraud, or other forms of plundering.
RIGHT TO APPRAIsAL
Contrasted with the common law right of inspection, there was no
common law right to have shares appraised and to be paid their value on
objection to a merger proceeding. However, the rule was well settled
that, in the absence of authority in the articles'of incorporation, there could
be no material and fundamental change in those articles without the
unanimous consent of the shareholders. This restriction covered the case
of a merger or consolidation with another corporation. 41 As business
conditions constantly grew more complicated, a single shareholder fre-
quently obstructed the proper growth and development of the corporation.
42
Consequently, many states passed statutes abrogating the rule requiring
unanimous approval.43 At the same time, for the protection of the dis-
senting shareholder, they provided an option whereby he could retire from
the enterprise and receive the value of his shares in money.44 In an early
New Jersey case,45 Vice-Chancellor Pitney, in referring to the appraisal
section of the state statute, stated that "the section ought to be liberally
construed in aid of the proposed remedy; and that the procedure should
not be hampered by technical conditions that are not expressed in the lan-
39. Morris v. Broadview, Inc., 317 Ill. App. 436, 46 N.E.2d 174 (1943), rev'd
on other grounds, 385 Ill. 228, 52 N.E.2d 769 (1944).
40. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1945, p. 1, col. 1 (statement by Harry W. Anderson).
41. Mills v. Penn-Lox Co., 36 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio App 1940); 15 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 7063 nA3 (Perm. ed. 1938).
42. Matter of Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 93 N.E. 522 (1910).
43. E.g., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW ANN. § 61 (1949); NEW YORK STOCK
CORPORATION LAW § 87 (1940); NEW JERSEY STAT. ANN. § 14:12-6 (1939).
44. It re Interborough Consolidated Corporation, 277 Fed. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1921);
Chicago Corporation v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 Atl. 452 (Ch. 1934).
45. New Jersey & H.R. Ry. v. American Electric Works, 82 N.J.L. 391, 81
Atl. 989, affirming 81 N.J.L. 34, 78 Atl. 670 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
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guage of the statute." Similar statements are prevalent in the cases and
texts. 46 However, the cases are split as to whether the term "shareholder,"
as contained in the statutes, includes equitable holders. The Pennsylvania
statute limits the right to "registered holders ;" and its courts have enforced
that requirement strictly. 47 A case arose in Ohio in which the petitioner
was a subscriber under an agreement whereby he was to pay for the shares
in installments and receive the certificates when he had fully paid. The
court decided that he was not a shareholder entitled to object to a merger
and have an appraisal of this stock.
48
The majority of cases in this field have arisen in Delaware and New
York-with directly opposite results. The earliest case to arise in New
York involved a situation in which twenty-three of petitioner's twenty-four
shares were not yet registered in his name.4 9 The court construed the
statute to include both registered and non-registered shareholders and thus
granted appraisal on all twenty-four shares. In a later case,50 the court
held that a shareholder who retained only the beneficial ownership of shares
which were registered in the name of trustees was entitled to object to the
sale of corporate assets and have an appraiser appointed to determine the
value of the shares, even though the trustees had voted in favor of the sale.
Employing the concept of ownership's being a "bundle of sticks," i.e., that
it is composed of many divisible rights and liabilities, the court said that
the trustees and the holders of the trust certificates were each "share-
holders" for some purposes. There are actually decisions in New York
which have held that record holders are not included in the statute, when
it is conclusively shown that they are not the real owners.5 ' The courts
have said that the statutory provision refers to the actual ownership of
stock, and not to shares standing in the name of one, but really the prop-
erty of another.
When a lower court in Delaware encountered these problems, it
adopted a liberal view. In the Salt Dome Oil case which arose in 1943,
the shares were registered in the name of an individual who held solely
for the benefit of the corporation.52 The chancellor decided that the Dela-
ware statute should be construed liberally to include the real owner, even
46. Schenck v. Salt Dome Oil Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 234, 34 A.2d 249 (Ch. 1943),
rev'd, 41 A.2d 583 (Del. 1945) ; In re Camden Trust Co., 121 N.J.L. 222, 1 A.2d
475 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Manning v. Brandon Corp., 163 S.C. 178, 161 S.E. 405 (1931).
47. Era Co. v. Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., 355 Pa. 219, 49 A.2d 342
(1946); see Graves v. Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., 355 Pa. 224, 49 A.2d
344 (1946).
48. Goodisson v. North American Securities Co., 40 Ohio App. 85, 176 N.E. 29
(1931).
49. In re Rowe, 107 Misc. 549, 176 N.Y. Supp. 753 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
50. In re Bacon, 262 App. Div. 818, 28 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd,
287 N.Y. 1, 38 N.E.2d 105 (1941).
51 Application of Friedman, 184 Misc. 639, 54 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Sup. Ct. 1945),
modified on other grounds, 269 App. Div. 834, 56 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1945) ; In re Rogers,
102 App. Div. 466, 92 N.Y. Supp. 465 (2d Dep't 1905). But see In re Northeastern
Water Co., 38 A.2d 918, 924 (Del. Ch. 1944).
52. Schenck v. Salt Dome Oil Corp., 27 Del .Ch. 234, 34 A.2d 249 (1943),
rev'd, 41 A.2d 583 (Del. 1945).
though its name did not appear on the books. In a subsequent decision
the court, relying heavily on the lower court ruling in the Salt Dome case,
held that the statute included one whose shares were held in a margin
account in the broker's name.5 3  However, on appeal to the Delaware
Supreme Court, the Salt Dome case was reversed. 54  The court decided
that an unregistered owner of shares did not have the status of a "stock-
holder" under the statute. There was a great deal of emphasis on the need
for order, certainty, and a sure source of information for the corporation
in these matters. This decision was the basis for the subsequent holding 5
that one whose shares were held by a broker was not entitled to appraisal
where the broker transferred the shares to his own name, contrary to the,
petitioner's express orders. The reasoning seems to be that the appoint-
ment of an appraiser, although performed by the chancellor, is really A
legal remedy and therefore is only available to the legal owner-i.e., the
owner of record. Though this rather stringent rule has not been repudi-
ated,5 6 it has been eased to some degree by a case holding that it is not
necessary to be registered at the record date set by the board of directors
for determining those entitled to vote on the merger57 All that is neces-
sary is to be record holder at the time of the suit. There have been similar
decisions in other jurisdictions.56
This problem has very rarely come before the courts in England. The
case which is most often referred to is one involving the executors of a
deceased shareholder.59 There the court decided that the executors had
the power to object to a merger, despite the fact that deceased had been
dead for over three years, and the executors had therefore had ample time
to have the stock transferred to their names.
RIGHT TO BRING A DERIVATIVE SUIT
One of the most important current topics in this field 60 is the right
of the corporate shareholder to bring a derivative suit.61 The first problem
which usually arises is whether or not it is necessary to be a shareholder
at the time of the transaction complained of. The majority rule at common
53. In re Universal Pictures Co., 37 A.2d 615 (Del. Ch. 1944).
54. Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 41 A.2d 583 (Del. 1945).
55. In re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 42 A.2d 24 (Del. Ch. 1945).
56. Schwartz v. The Olympic, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 800 (Del. 1947).
57. Lewis v. Corroon & Reynolds Corp., 57 A.2d 632 (Del. Ch. 1948).
58. In re Bazar, 183 Misc. 736, 50 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Meriman v.
Otis Steel Co., 26 Ohio Ops. 433, 12 Ohio Supp. 27 (1943).
59. Llewellyn v. Kasintoe Rubber Estates, [1914] 2 Ch. 670, aff'd, [1914] 2 Ch.
682.
60. Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits; How Far Is Cali-
foda's New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound?, 37 CALiF. L. REv. 399 (1949);
Frey, Noteworthy Decisions in the Law of Private Corporations: 1940-1945; 94
U. OF PA. L. Rr'v. 765, 772 (1946).
61. For purposes of this note, that term will be defined as a suit in which the
shareholder's interest is his eventual proportion of a claim which the corporation
has as a creditor of the defendant, and in which the shareholder sues in behalf of him-
self and all other shareholders similarly situated.
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law was that it was not a necessary requisite, since the cause of action was
considered a part of the assets in which a shareholder had a transferable
interest.6 2 Even under this majority view, consent, participation or ac-
quiescence of a holder of shares sufficient to prevent him from attacking
a corporate act, precludes an attack by a transferee of the shares to the
same extent as if he were the consenting shareholder.6 The Supreme
Court grew concerned about the corporate device of having an out of state
individual buy a few shares of stock and then institute a derivative suit, in
order to provide the diversity of citizenship necessary to get the case in the
federal courts. 64  Therefore, the federal courts adopted Federal Equity
Rule 23(b) which requires that one be a shareholder at the time of the
transaction complained of.65 Similar provisions were adopted by many
state legislatures; '0 and some state courts have adopted the rule even in
the absence of a statute, 67 though a majority of states still follow the more
liberal view.68 Since the purpose of such statutes was to prevent an indi-
vidual from buying a law suit by buying shares after he has learned of a
wrong done to the corporation, it has been held almost unanimously that
"shareholder," as used in the statutes, does not mean that the party must
have been a holder of record. 69 Therefore, equitable shareholders have been
placed on par with legal shareholders in bringing this type of suit. In
Delaware the problem arose in the recent case of Rosenthal v. Burry Bis-
cuit Corporation."0 In an interesting and able opinion, Vice-Chancellor
Seitz distinguished this action from that involved in the Salt Dome case,
discussed supra in regard to merger, and permitted plaintiff, who was the
holder of street certificates at time of transaction, to bring a derivative suit.
One of the distinctions drawn between the power to vote, receive dividends,
or oppose a merger and the power to bring a derivative suit was that the
former functions are "intracorporate" and that therefore the corporation
needs a rather inflexible basis of shareholder identity, which is not neces-
sary in the case of a derivative suit. While this is undoubtedly a valid
distinction, the need for corporate regularity should not be controlling in
62. E.g., Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N.Y. 11, 94 N.E. 1088 (1911). Contra: e.g.,
Jepsen v. Peterson, 69 S.D. 338, 10 N.W.2d 749 (1943).
63. E.g., Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336 Pa. 122, 8 A.2d 36 (1939).
64. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 452 (1881).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 23b (1946).
66. E.g., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW ANN. § 51-a (1949); RULES OF EQUITY
PRACTICE OF PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT, Rule 37 (1944).
67. E.g., Jepsen v. Peterson, 69 S.D. 338, 10 N.W.2d 749 (1943).
68. See states listed in 148 A.L.R. 1090 et seq. Note that NEW YORK [N.Y.
GEN. CORP. LAW § 61 (1950 Supp.)] and NEW JERSEY [N.J. REv. STAT. §14:3-10
(Supp. 1945)] have joined the states following rule 23b.
69. H.F.G. v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 162 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1947); Hurt v.
Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 145 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Gallup v. Caldwell, 120
F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (Ky.
1939), aff'd, 127 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 639 (1942). Contra:
Bankers National Corp. v. Barr, 7 F.R.D. 305 (N.Y. 1945). But see Rosenthal v.
Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106, 113 (Del. Ch. 1948).
70. 60 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 1948) ; 17 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 194 (1949); 23 TEMP.
L.Q. 82 (1949) ; 34 VA. L. REv. 837 (1948).
all the named instances. However, this indication of a desire to limit the
holding of the Salt Dome case as far as possible is gratifying in a state
long known for its inclination to cater to corporate management.
In the federal courts, there is a split of authority as to whether the
provisions of Rule 23 (b) are procedural, and therefore governed by federal
interpretation; or substantive, and therefore governed by applicable state
law under the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. 71 The recent trend is
toward the view that they are procedural.72
The next problem is whether or not it is necessary to be a shareholder
of record at the time of bringing the suit. The cases on this point are
divided. 73 When the point arose in New Jersey in the case of Hodge v.
United States Steel Corp.,74 it was held that one must be a shareholder of
record. Shortly thereafter, in an able and often quoted opinion, Vice-
Chancellor Pitney distinguished the Hodge case and decided that a trans-
feree who had never had the shares transferred into his name on the cor-
poration's books had the right to bring a derivative suit.7 5 Unfortunately,
too much emphasis was placed on the fact that plaintiff in that case could
have had the transfer made at any time or, as Vice-Chancellor Pitney
expressed it, " . the complete legal and beneficial title ." had
passed. 76 Thus, he attempted to draw a distinction for this purpose be-
tween a transferor-transferee situation and one in which the shares are
held in trust. Much later, a district court case, applying New Jersey law,
and relying therefor on the above cases, upheld the right of a holder of
street certificates to bring a derivative suit."" However, in 1943, the New
Jersey court, ignoring earlier cases, held that one must be a holder of
record. 78 This latter decision might possibly be justified on the basis of
the above distinction drawn by Vice-Chancellor Pitney. There is nothing
in the case, however, to indicate what type of "equitable" title plaintiff had.
On the whole, the opinion would seem to be an ill-considered one, since the
court relied entirely on the early Hodge case and never even mentioned
the two intervening cases, supra.
Again in this field, the New York courts have adopted a liberal attitude.
They specifically permit legatees, who are beneficial owners by virtue of
contract with decedent's executor, to maintain a derivative suit.79 They
71. 46 MicH. L. REv. 431 (1948).
72. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 721-723 (Supp. 1950).
73. Compare Hall v. M.B. O'Reilly Realty & Investment Co., 306 Mo. 182, 267
S.W. 407 (1924), with McHenry v. N.Y.P. & O.R.R., 22 Fed. 130 (C.C.E.D.
Ohio 1884).
74. 64 N.J. Eq. 90, 53 AtI. 601 (Ch. 1902), revd on other grmounds, 64 NJ.
Eq. 807, 54 AUt. 1 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903).
75. O'Connor v. International Silver Co., 68 N.J. Eq. 67, 59 Atl. 321 (Ch.
1904), aff'd, 68 N.J. Eq. 680, 62 Atl. 408 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905).
76. Id. at 73, 59 Atl; at 324.
77. Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941).
78. Bookmaan v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 116, 30 A.2d 823
(1943).
79. Law v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 271 App. Div. 705, 68
N.Y.S.2d 143 (1st Dep't 1947), reversing 189 Misc. 200, 66 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1946);
Baum v. Sporborg, 146 App. Div. 537, 131 N.Y. Supp. 267 (2d Dep't 1911).
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also allow the action by a beneficiary under a trust agreement.
8 0 State-
ments in the New York cases indicate that the courts of that state would
go a long way in protecting the rights of equitable owners in this category.
The rule was stated in Litwin v. Allen 81 as follows: ". . . the law is
well settled that a stockholder need not be the owner of record to institute
the action. .... "
In the federal courts there is a disagreement as to whether the require-
ment of being a record holder at the time of suit is a matter of procedure
or of substance . 2  However, the decisions have almost unanimously
affirmed the right of equitable holders of all types to bring this action.
83
Various state courts have held that the action may be brought by a
pledgor,8 4 a pledgee,8 5 a cestui que trust,8 6 an unrecorded transferee,
8 7 by
one whose shares are held by a nominee, 8 and by one who is the equitable
owner under a will.89  Where the plaintiff has been induced to transfer
his shares by fraud, the cases are divided as to his right to maintain a
derivative suit. Where the wrongful conduct which causes the plaintiff to
transfer his shares is a part of the conduct which injured the corporation,
so that the evidence proving the wrong to the corporation will, either alone
or With little additional evidence, establish the plaintiff's right to recover
his shares, he may generally maintain a single suit to recover in both his
80. Braman v. Westaway, 60 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
81. 168 Misc. 205, 4 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
82. Compare Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941), with H.F.G. Co.
v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 162 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1947); 46 MIcH. L. Rav. 431
(1948).
83. H.F.G. Co. v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 162 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1947) (stock
held by a nominee) ; It re Western Tool and Mfg. Co., 142 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1944),
rev'd on other grounds, 324 U.S. 100 (1945) (holder of voting trust trustee certifi-
cate); Goldstein v. Grosbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944) (double derivative
suit); Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941) (holder of street certificates) ;
Arcola Sugar Mills Co. v. Burnham, 67 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1933) (pledgee); Crafts-
man Finance & Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. N.Y. 1945) (equitable
owners under an unexecuted stock exchange agreement) ; Richardson v. Blue Grass
Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Ky. 1939), aff'd, 127 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 639 (1942) (plaintiffs entitled to 50% of the capital stock,
but not of record) ; Starrett Corp. v. Fifth Avenue & Twenty-Ninth St. Corp., 1
F.Supp. 868 (S.D. N.Y. 1932); see Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 145 F.2d
293, 295 (5th Cir. 1944) (residuary legatee). Contra: McHenry v. N.Y.P. & O.R.R.,
22 Fed. 130 (C.C.E.D. Ohio 1884) (stockholders, subject to prior claims of bond-
holders); Brown v. Duluth, M. & N. Ry., 53 Fed. 889 (C.C. Minn. 1893) (transferee
not yet registered on the corporate books); Bankers National Corp. v. Barr, 7
F.R.D. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (stock held through a nominee).
84. Fisher v. Patton, 134 Mo. 32, 33 S.W. 451 (1895), 34 S.W. 1096 (1896).
85. Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N.W. 261 (1879).
86. Hall v. M. B. O'Reilly Realty & Investment Co., 306 Mo. 182, 267 S.W. 407
(1924) ; Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 119 W.Va. 167, 192 S.E. 545 (1937) ;
see Smith v. Bramwell, 146 Ore. 611, 31 P.2d 647 (1934).
87. Graeser v. Phoenix Finance Co., 218 Iowa 1112, 254 N.W. 859 (1934);
Kimball v. Bangs, 321 Mich. 394, 32 N.W.2d 831 (1948); First National Bank
of Sulphur Springs v. Stribling, 16 Okla. 41, 86 Pac. 512 (1905).
88. Endsley v. Darring, 249 Ala. 381, 31 So.2d 317 (1947).
89. Law v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 271 App. Div. 705, 68 N.Y.S.2d
143 (1st Dep't 1947), reversing 66 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1946). Contra: Klopstock v.
Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 13, 108 P.2d 906 (1941).
NOTES
individual and derivative capacities. 9° It has been held, however, that
where the conduct causing plaintiff to transfer his shares is not closely
connected with the wrong to the corporation such a joinder is multifarious,
and that plaintiff must first secure a restoration of his status as a share-
holder before bringing a derivative suit.91
Where the issue involved is clearly a matter of business judgment, the
rule is well settled that courts will not intervene.92 However, where the
issue concerns a fraud on the corporation, either by the directors or by an
outsider, there should be some adequate protection for the stockholders.
The stockholder's derivative suit has long been considered by many experts
in the field to be the only remaining remedy.93 It provides a method of
calling management to account for its wrongs and obtaining restitution.
Although it has at times been abused in so-called "strike suits" by those
who are not attempting to redress a real wrong but who are attempting to
exploit their nuisance potential and force a private settlement, 94 that abuse
has not been nearly so flagrant as interested pressure groups have repre-
sented it to be in their efforts to force through restrictive legislation. 95
Nevertheless, legislatures in several states have now passed legislation 96
requiring those who own less than a stipulated amount of stock to post
a bond to be used, in the court's discretion, to pay the expenses of certain
of the defendants, in case plaintiff should be unsuccessful This legislation,
while attaining its goal of greatly eliminating nuisance "strike suits," has
removed the last means of protection of a great segment of corporate share-
holders. Thus, it has been widely subjected to the severest criticism.
9 7 It
is similar to the regulation previously discussed, which requires that for one
to bring a derivative suit he must be a stockholder at the time of the trans-
action complained of. It is necessary to strike a middle ground between
protecting the interests of the investors on the one hand, and discouraging
strike suits and hamstringing corporate management on the other.98 This
90. E.g., Price v. Union Land Co., 187 Fed. 886 (8th Cir. 1911). Contra:
Barnett v. Ground, 304 Mo. 593, 263 S.W. 836 (1924).
91. See, e.g., Empire Realty Co. v. Harton, 176 Ala. 99, 101, 57 So. 763, 765
(1911).
92. Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890);
Carson, Current Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 40 MIcH. L. REv.
1125 (1942).
93. Frey, supra note 60, at 773; Purcell, Foster & Hill, Enforcing the Account-
ability of Corporate Management, 32 VA. L. REv. 497 (1946) ; Simpson, Fifty Years
of American Equity, 50 HARv. L. REv. 171, 191 (1936).
94. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949),
affirming Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948);
Notes, 34 COL. L. REv. 1308 (1934), 23 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 296 (1949).
95. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 32 CALIF. L.
REv. 123 (1944).
96. E.g., NEW YoRx GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §61b (Supp. 1950); NEW
JERSEY REV. STAT. § 14:3-15 (Supp. 1945); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (Purdon,
Supp. 1945).
97. Ballantine, supra note 60; Hornstein, supra note 95; Hornstein, New Aspects
of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COL. L. REv. 1 (1947); Zlinkoff, The American
Investor and the Constitutionality of Section 61-b of the New York General Corpora-
tion Law, 54 YALE LJ. 351 (1945).
98. Rohrlich, Suits in Equity by Minority Stockholders as a Means of Corporate
Control, 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 692 (1933).
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legislation, however, makes no effort to distinguish between those genuinely
interested in righting a wrong done to the corporation, and those who are
selfishly thinking only of personal gain. Instead of reaching a solution to
an important problem, instead of providing some aid for the admittedly
inadequate remedy provided by the derivative suit, the legislatures in the
above jurisdictions have gone to the other extreme and effectively cut off
the last remedy open to the great majority of those interested in protect-
ing their investments. Such statutes will obviously encourage management
in its already too prevalent attitude of independence.
DOUBLE DERIVATIVE SUITS
A somewhat analogous situation, and one which properly falls within
the scope of this paper, involves the "double derivative suit." This term
has been applied to cases where Corporation A owns all or a majority of
the stock of Corporation B and where a stockholder of A is suing on behalf
of B. The customary defense is that Corporation A is the proper party
to bring such a suit-not the complaining shareholder, who is not even of
record as to Corporation B. In the main, the courts have properly denied
such contentions and upheld the shareholder's right to sue.9 9 This was
the decision of the federal courts under the old Equity Rules, 100 and it has
been followed more recently under Rule 23(b) 1'1 -said to be ."only a
scrupulous re-enactment of the old equity rule." 102 In addition to the
relevant federal decisions, this right has been repeatedly upheld by the
state courts. 0 3 This majority view is unquestionably the correct one,
especially where the two corporations involved are closely interwoven.
Any burden or loss which falls on Corporation A as a result of the damage
or wrong to Corporation B will obviously ultimately fall on the share-
holders of the former. They are the real parties in interest. Consequently,
if the directors of both corporations-who may well be involved in the
transaction on their own behalf-refuse to sue, the shareholders should
have some practical remedy to protect their paramount interest.
ANALYSIS OF THE BASES ON WHICH RIGHTS OF EQUITABLE
SHAREHOLDERS ARE SOMETIMES DENIED
The court in Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co.10 4 stated, "Assuredly
it is not the purpose of either the statute or the rule to afford the holder
99. 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CoRoRAnoNs § 5977 (Perm. ed. 1938); Note,
Remedies of Stockholder of Parent Corporation for Injuries to Subsidiaries, 50
HARV. L. REv. 963 (1937); See Note, 154 A.L.R. 1295 (1945).
100. United States Lines v. United States Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148 (2d Cir.
1937).
101. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944); 30 VA. L. REv. 668 (1944).
102. Galdi v. Jones, 141 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1944).
103. E.g., Martin v. D. B. Martin Co., 10 Del. Ch 211, 88 Atl 612, 102 Atl.
373 (1913); Holmes v. Camp, 180 App. Div. 409, 167 N.Y. Supp. 840 (1917).
104. 145 F.2d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 1944).
of the naked legal title to shares of stock a right of action and to deny the
holder of a higher right, the equitable title, such a privilege. The protec-
tion of the law would hardly be denied to the owner of the substance, mean-
while being accorded to the holder of the shadow."
What then is the basis of such a discrimination? A reading of the
cases discloses no very coherent considerations on this subject. One argu-
ment frequently advanced is that there is a need for order and certainty
and a sure source of information so that the corporation may know with
whom it is dealing.10 5 While the desirability of order and certainty can-
not be denied, such a consideration should not be permitted to outweigh that
of adequately protecting the shareholder. After all, it is his corporation,
being operated by his managers, for him. Meeting this contention in a
more direct fashion, there is very little red tape involved on the part of the
corporation. In order to enforce his right as a shareholder, an individual
must first prove his identification. 10 6 The burden is on the shareholder
and not on the corporation. Therefore, the amount of inconvenience in-
volved in keeping a set of books open to the public, or in deciding as to an
individual's right to appraisal, seems negligible when it is considered that
these are two of the few remaining protections for the modern shareholder.
The argument is even less plausible in the case of a derivative suit, where
the action is against a third party and on behalf of the corporation.
Another contention sometimes advanced is that since the corporation
can rely on its stock ledger to determine voting rights and rights to divi-
dends,10 7 the same rule should apply to appraisal, inspection, etc. This
would seem to be the grossest type of conceptualism. One important dis-
tinction which immediately comes to mind is that the equitable owner, by
virtue of his rights against the record holder, has a protection as to his
right to vote and receive dividends which he does not possess in other fields.
A more desirable approach would be to conceive of ownership as a "bundle
of sticks" and therefore vary the result depending on the purpose for
which suit is brought.'08 If a transferee, for example, does not have record
ownership transferred to his name, that is a risk that he takes as far as
the voting privilege is concerned. That, however, should have nothing to
do with his right to an appraisal. The question is sometimes asked, "Why
not have the record holder act and then there would be no problem ?" Even
assuming we are in one of the jurisdictions where the courts recognize a
mere record holder wrho has no beneficial interest, one can imagine many
instances in which it would be impossible to force action by the record
105. Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 41 A.2d 583 (Del. Ch. 1945), reversing
27 Del. Ch. 234, 34 A.2d 249 (Ch. 1943).
106. Bowser v. State, 192 Ind. 462, 137 N.E. 57 (1922).
107. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corporation, 60 A.2d 106, 112 (Del.
Ch. 1948).
108. See, e.g., Brentmore Estates v. Hotel Barbizon, 263 App. Div. 389, 393,
33 N.Y.S.2d 331, 336 (1st Dep't 1942); Smith v. Bramwell, 146 Ore. 611, 612,
31 P.2d 647, 648 (1934).
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holder. For example, a cestui que trust cannot mandamus his trustee, since
theirs is generally a contract relationship. 10 9
CONCLUSION
The wide distribution of shareholdings, 0 with the consequent apathy
on the part of most of the shareholders, plus the demonstrable independence
of management with its accompanying opportunity to plunder the corpora-
tion, shows clearly the need for judicial relief whenever shareholders are
able to overcome the barriers and get into court. The question then be-
comes, should the courts afford record holders a different relief than that
afforded equitable owners? Basically, the right to relief is founded on
interest. The rationale is that a shareholder has an investment in the cor-
poration; and as such has both an interest and a right to see to it that his
money is used for the direct benefit of the corporation and therefore, in-
directly, for his benefit. Assuming then that the basis for relief is interest,
it is clear that, on that ground at least, there is no reason for discriminating
between the record and the equitable shareholder. Rather it would seem
that it is the equitable holder who deserves primary consideration. It is his
money which is involved, and any loss will fall upon his shoulders.
As has already been pointed out, protection has been provided in the
case of the double derivative suit. There would seem to be no logical basis
for providing relief for this class of shareholders and refusing it to those
we normally consider as equitable owners. The former are actually one
step further removed than the latter from the corporation on whose behalf
they seek to bring suit.
To carry this discussion to only one of its logical conclusions would be
to realize that if the shareholders lose all effective control over corporate
management, the search will soon begin for another source of control.
Nothing would be more plausible in these days of increasing governmental
expansion, than that this duty would fall upon the state. That would be a
truly ironical twist--the very antithesis of the goal towards which cor-
porate management, and courts in those states desirous of attracting new
business, are striving. Perhaps if the courts will look behind such labels
as legal or equitable title and do everything possible to protect those who
are genuinely in interest, such a result will be avoided. Courts cannot do
the whole job, however, especially in the face of the recent restrictive
legislation.
It is to be hoped that legislatures will take note of the widespread
criticism, and will make an attempt to reach a workable plan of protecting
shareholders' interests while placing barriers in the way of such undesirable
features as the "strike suit."
C. Thomas Attix, Jr.
109. See Brentmore Estates v. Hotel Barbizon, supra note 108, at 394, 33
N.Y.S.2d at 336.
110. GRANBY, SURVEY OF SHAREHOLDINGS IN 1710 CORPORATIONS WITH SECU-
RITIES LISTED ON A NATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE (TNEC Monograph 30, 1941).
